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Rattling Europe's ordoliberal ‘iron cage’: the contestation of 
austerity in Southern Europe  
 
Theodoros Papadopoulosi and Antonios Roumpakis  
 
  
 
Abstract   
 
This article explains the popular revolt against austerity in Southern Europe as the outcome 
of profound politico-economic changes that are shaped by the transformation of the 
European Union’s (EU’s) macro-economic governance. It comprises three parts. The first part 
demonstrates how ordoliberalism – the Germanic variant of (neo)liberal economic thinking – 
was embedded in the EU’s new macro-economic governance, in processes that 
constitutionalise austerity and remove democratic controls over the economy. The second 
part examines the impact of austerity-driven reforms on welfare and employment in the 
aftermath of the sovereign debt crisis. These reforms undermined the social reproduction of 
Southern Europe’s familistic welfare model by destabilising three key pillars of social 
protection: employment security for households’ primary earners; small property ownership; 
and pension adequacy. The third part analyses the emergence of anti-austerity social politics 
in Southern Europe, both parliamentary and grassroots, and assesses their effectiveness in 
light of the collapse of public trust in both EU and domestic political institutions. The article 
concludes with our reflections on the fragility of EU’s integration process under the hegemony 
of ordoliberalism.  
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 Introduction   
 
In our article we explore the context of popular revolt against austerity in Southern Europe in 
the aftermath of the sovereign debt crisis. We show how austerity-driven reforms became 
part of the reconfiguration of EU’s macro-economic governance under the hegemony of 
ordoliberalism – the ‘particular German variant of neoliberalism’ (Woodruff, 2016: 94) – and 
analyse the implications for welfare policies and politics. In this context, our article 
contributes to the growing literature on the transformation of welfare, and its politics, in the 
age of permanent austerity. This literature includes studies exploring the pressures for the 
institutionalisation of austerity and the marketisation of welfare globally (Holden, 2014; 
Milanovich, 2016) and in Europe (Gill, 2017; Streeck, 2012, 2013, 2014); the challenges to the 
European social model before and after the Euro Crisis (Copeland and Daly, 2015; Menz and 
Crespy, 2015; Kennett, 2017; Vaughan-Whitehead, 2014); the comparative political economy 
of welfare in times of austerity (Farnsworth and Irving, 2015); and, especially for Southern 
Europe, the impact of austerity on socioeconomic security (Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 
2013, 2015; Petmesidou, 2013; Moreira et al., 2015; Petmesidou and Glatzer, 2015) and the 
character of democratic politics in the aftermath of the sovereign-debt crisis (Verney and 
Bosco, 2013; Matthijs, 2014; Afouxenidis, 2015; Giannone, 2015; Gropas, 2016).  
 
The article comprises three sections. The first section traces the emergence of EU’s new 
(ordoliberal) macro-economic governance and interrogates its role in advancing the 
reconfiguration of member states’ political economies under conditions of high sovereign 
debt. The second section provides a brief overview of the type and extent of austerity-driven 
reforms in the areas of employment, pensions and taxation in four Southern European 
countries (Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal). By analysing the socioeconomic effects of these 
reforms we demonstrate how the crisis has dramatically accelerated the scope and severity 
of market-enhancing reforms already underway pre-crisis. In the third part we analyse the 
sociopolitical reactions to austerity. We discuss the rise of anti-austerity politics, both 
parliamentary and grassroots, and evaluate their effectiveness against the backdrop of the 
spectacular decline of public trust towards the EU and domestic political institutions.  
 
 Ordoliberalism and the new European economic Governance  
Ordoliberalism emerged in Germany ‘as a reaction both to the consequences of unregulated 
liberalism in the early twentieth century and subsequent Nazi fiscal and monetary 
interventionism’ (Dullien and Guérot, 2012: 1; on the origins of ordoliberalism see also 
Bonefeld, 2013). Its ‘central tenet’ is that ‘governments should regulate markets in such a way 
that market outcomes approximate the theoretical outcome in a perfectly competitive 
market’ (Dullien and Guérot, 2012: 1). In short, contrary to the belief in the capacity of ‘free’ 
market to generate spontaneous order and the, generally, anti-statist predisposition of 
mainstream neoliberalism, ordoliberalism deems state intervention as essential in creating 
the order necessary for the creation of a market society. As Storey (2017: 3) described it, ‘for 
ordoliberals, enterprise and competition need to be fostered and protected, at the level of 
both the individual and the firm, [as] they do not occur “naturally”’. In turn, ‘uploaded’ at the 
level of European macro-economic governance, German-led ordoliberalism framed both the 
formal principles and operational mechanisms of the European Monetary Union (EMU), 
prescribing specific roles for member states, EU institutions and socioeconomic regulation.  
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In particular, the launch of the EMU in 1992 heralded a new era in the history of European 
integration. For its creators, a key objective of the EMU was to act as a catalyst for the capital-
friendly restructuring of EU member states’ tax and welfare systems, industrial relations and 
business regulations. Robert Mundell, the so-called ‘spiritual father’ of the Euro1 (1) described 
how, in the EMU, ‘monetary policy [was designed to be] out of the reach of politicians’ and 
how ‘without fiscal policy, the only way nations can keep jobs is by the competitive reduction 
of rules on business’ (Guardian, 2012). Jean-Claude Trichet, ex-president of the European 
Central Bank (2003–11), highlighted as one of EMU’s positive consequences that firms will 
become ‘more and more sensitive to overall labour cost differentials and business regulation 
in choosing a particular location in the Eurozone, [and therefore] exert a considerable 
pressure for appropriate reforms’ (quote in Degryse et al., 2013: 16, emphasis ours). Still, 
prior to the eruption of the sovereign-debt crisis, much of the member states’ fiscal and 
financial sovereignty remained intact while market- enhancing reforms continued to be 
embroiled in national democratic politics. In fact, as far as Southern Europe was concerned, 
the pace of neoliberal reforms was rather slow prior to the crisis and in most countries 
incremental (Spain probably being the only exception). Especially in Greece, reforms were 
met with fierce resistance from labour unions and received only lukewarm approval from 
electorates.  
 
The picture changed in the aftermath of the sovereign debt-crisis. Not only the pace of 
legislating and implementing reforms accelerated  dramatically (see Degryse et. al., 2013; 
Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 2013) but their external imposition as prerequisites for bail-
out loans facilitated their integration into the far-reaching reconfiguration of EU’s 
socioeconomic governance that took place at the same time (Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 
2015; Sacchi, 2015). The outbreak of the sovereign-debt crisis provided a window of 
opportunity to EU politico-economic elites to advance even faster a process that has been 
variably characterised as the constitutionalisation of neoliberal economic governance 
(Giannone, 2015), the rise of ‘disciplinary neo-liberalism’ (Gill, 2017), ‘embedded neo-
liberalism’ (Cahill, 2014), or the ‘refeudalisation of law’ in Europe (Supiot, 2013). Following 
authors like Gill (2017), Worth (2016), Woodruff (2016) and Ryner (2015) we attribute this 
transformation to the rise, and eventual hegemony, of the particular variant of neoliberalism, 
German-led ordoliberalism, as the dominant paradigm of European macro-economic 
governance.  
 
Originally embedded in the Stability and Growth Pact (1999) it was the Fiscal Compact treaty 
(2012) that marked the hegemony of ordoliberalism’s rationale in the institutions enforcing 
national governments’ compliance to the EMU imperatives, even when these went against 
the national publics’ democratically expressed preferences or were damaging national 
economies. As Dr Wolfgang Schäuble, the German Federal Minister of Finance and self-
proclaimed Ordoliberal2 stated: ‘elections cannot be allowed to change an economic 
programme of a member state’ (Guardian, 2016).  
 
The ‘bailout’ agreements for Greece, Portugal and Ireland, as well as the so-called ‘stand-by’ 
agreements for Italy and Spain, became directly linked to this fundamental reconfiguration of 
the EU’s economic governance. The process was enacted through two distinct, but related, 
                                                          
1 See the January 2001 article in the Irish Times (Suiter, 2001). 
2 Speech by Dr Wolfgang Schäuble at the 4th Lindau Meeting in Economics, 27 August 2011.  
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institutional innovations. One innovation involved the ad hoc creation of the unofficial, yet 
extremely powerful, ‘troika’ of lenders, comprising the European Commission (EC), the 
European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Troika was 
formed to enforce and evaluate the implementation of market- enhancing policies and 
austerity measures imposed as conditionalities for monetary assistance. The narrative that 
legitimised the unprecedented surrender of national fiscal and financial sovereignty was that 
such reforms were the only alternative for indebted Eurozone countries to ‘balance their 
books’, recover their economic stability and prepare to return to the global financial markets 
(see also Ojala and Harjuniemi, 2016). The other innovation involved member states agreeing 
to a set of official transnational macro-economic surveillance mechanisms that monitor 
‘competitiveness alert thresholds’ – involving factors like wage remuneration and labour 
productivity – as well as the creation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), a supra-
state institution meant to deal with indebted member states, with enormous fiscal powers 
but very unclear line of accountability (see Roumpakis and Papadopoulos, 2017).  
 
Under the new regime, for the first time in their history, EU institutions extended their 
competence in policy areas previously under the sole jurisdiction of national governments, 
like deciding state budgets or setting national wage levels (see also Barbier 2012). In 
particular, under the rhetorical guise of improving the quality of the EU’s macro-economic 
coordination, wage policy became ‘the most important adjustment variable for promoting 
competitiveness’ (Busch et al., 2013: 8). First, the so-called ‘Six-Pack’ agreement (December 
2011) stipulated that public sector wages should be revised in order not to hamper 
competition with the private sector while wage increases in the private sector cannot exceed 
rates of productivity increases. Failure to comply with the rules incurs a financial penalty equal 
to 0.1 per cent of a member state’s gross domestic product (GDP).3 Furthermore, under the 
rules of the Fiscal Compact Treaty, signed in March 2012, the member states’ budgets are 
required to be balanced or in surplus. As these rules are required to have a binding force and 
permanent character (European Council, 2012), they have to be enshrined in national law, 
preferably through constitutional amendments, making austerity a permanent feature of 
European integration (Dehousse, 2012; Streeck, 2013). As Gill (2017: 639–640) remarked:  
 
Article 11 [of the Treaty] required EU coordination of all economic policy 
reforms, restricting any single country from developing an alternative 
economic policy. In contrast to all other EU treaties, it allows the European 
Court of Justice to fine a Member State for non-compliance. Both the [1999] 
Growth and Stability Pact and the Fiscal Compact are quintessentially 
European examples of the new constitutionalism of disciplinary neoliberalism, 
incorporating new transnational legal measures and mechanisms of 
surveillance. These measures serve to lock-in commitments to neoliberal 
regulation and frameworks of accumulation in ways that correspond to the 
‘iron cage’ of Germanic ordoliberalism. (Ryner, 2015)  
 
The signing of the Fiscal Compact treaty in 2012 formalised the process of constitutionalising 
ordoliberalism in the EU. Across most of the EU, wages and working conditions are now to be 
                                                          
3 Interestingly, similar mechanisms of surveillance for poverty reduction are absent in the adopted strategy of 
‘Europe 2020’ (June 2010) that replaced the Lisbon Strategy (Copeland and Daly, 2015; de la Porte and Heins, 
2015). 
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treated as key adjustment variables in the promotion of economic competitiveness (thus 
replacing nominal exchange rates). Crucially, responsibility for competitiveness remains 
attached to the EU member states. Under the treaty, member states can exercise control over 
fiscal or wage policy as long as the latter conform to the disciplinary ‘boundaries’ (e.g. limits 
of public budget deficits or competitiveness targets) set by the new rules. Thus, for countries 
facing severe economic difficulties, like Spain and Greece, adopting anti-cyclical fiscal policies 
is prohibited. The only remaining option is internal devaluation by means of wage reductions, 
welfare cuts and continuous undermining of employment protection (see also Table 2 on 
Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 2017a).  
 
Under the new EU economic governance national governments are primarily held 
accountable ‘upwards’, to new EU institutions, for their effectiveness in disciplining wage 
demands that outstrip productivity and competitiveness and for what is now permanently 
institutionalised public budget discipline. The new institutional architecture not only 
perpetuates structural economic asymmetries between core and peripheral EU political 
economies but severely deepens them, driving the peripheral member states, especially in 
the European South, into a spiral of continuous internal devaluation. In this context, popular 
rejections of austerity were almost inevitable (Bonefeld, 2015: 882), though in Southern 
Europe they also coincided with an unprecedented delegitimation of the European 
integration project itself. Still, to appreciate the significance of the popular revolt against 
austerity, we need to comprehend the type and extent of austerity-driven reforms and their 
socioeconomic impact.  
 
 
 Southern Europe: Austerity measures and their Impact  
 
In Southern Europe, reforms like the promotion of ‘flexible’ employment practices, the 
expansion of part-time employment or the weakening of collective bargaining were already 
underway prior to the sovereign debt crisis (Karamessini, 2008; Papadopoulos and 
Roumpakis, 2012). Still, as we explained above, the process of dealing with the eruption of 
the sovereign debt crisis enabled the acceleration of their pace. Reforms involved 
(indicatively): drastic cuts in pensions and public health (Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 2013; 
Petmesidou, 2013), privatisation of state enterprises (see Zacune et. al., 2013); labour market 
deregulation (see Degryse et. al., 2013), decentralisation of collective bargaining systems (see 
Bernaciak and Müller, 2013; Busch et. al., 2013;) and cutting wages (see Karamessini and 
Giakoumatos, 2016). Since the beginning of the crisis minimum wages have been frozen and 
automatic wage increases have been suspended in Spain and Portugal while in Greece, Spain 
and Portugal public sector salaries were severely cut. Moreira et al (2015: 205–212) identified 
no less than 76 labour reforms adopted in a period of three years alone (2010–13). The largest 
number was enacted in Greece (29), followed by Spain (22), Portugal (17) and Italy (8). They 
comprised a ‘full spectrum’ attack on established socioeconomic rights protecting workers 
both in and out of employment such as: drastic reductions in the protection against individual 
and collective dismissals; substantial cuts in severance payments, minimum wages and the 
levels (and duration) of unemployment benefits; erosion of protection when temporarily 
unemployed; and direct assaults upon national collective bargaining arrangements by means 
of formalising decentralised, firm-based, bargaining (see also Marginson, 2015; Papadopoulos 
and Roumpakis, 2017a).  
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In pensions, while many reforms were underway prior to the crisis – driven, primarily, by 
concerns with cost-containment and long-term financial sustainability (Natali and Stamati, 
2014; Petmesidou and Glatzer, 2015) – their scale and pace accelerated post-crisis. In a 
detailed comparative study of austerity measures in the EU Hermann (2014: Table 2) 
identified numerous additional pension reforms including:  
 further rises in retirement age – combined with the extension of contribution periods 
and the introduction of automatic adjustment of retirement age to life expectancy 
(Greece, Italy and Spain)  
 extensive cuts in pension payments (Greece and Portugal)  
 temporary pensions freezes (Greece, Italy, and Portugal), and  
 measures restricting access to invalidity pensions and early retirement (Portugal)  
 
Furthermore, in Greece, the government’s decision to include occupational pension funds in 
the so-called ‘haircut’ on the value of privately held government bonds in March 2012 
resulted in massive losses in their assets – 50% or more – further undermining the adequacy 
of future pension payments (Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 2013; Petmesidou and Glatzer 
2015).  
 
Implementing austerity reforms in Southern Europe meant not only reducing public 
expenditures but also increasing revenues through taxation on ‘immobile assets – i.e. 
consumers and low-income earners’ (Schäfer and Streeck, 2013: 18). As Streeck (2013: 283) 
argued, in this new era, citizens, are expected to ‘credibly commit themselves to fiscal 
consolidation’ of their states. Contrary to the low-tax, minimal-state, approach of neoliberal 
policies, state action by Southern European governments focused on substantially increasing 
tax revenues in at least four ways: by increasing direct taxation via increases in personal 
income tax; by eliminating tax deductions; by enacting emergency levies on income or 
housing; and by lowering income tax thresholds (see Simonazzi and Barbieri, 2016; 
Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 2015). Typically, in Greece, the tax-free income threshold was 
reduced by more than half while in Italy family tax allowances were cut under the Monti 
government in 2011. Additionally, Greece, Italy and Portugal witnessed new taxes on specific 
sources of income like occupational pensions and, more importantly, on property 
(Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 2017a). Taxing the latter hit hard what is probably the most 
important pillar of socioeconomic security of Southern European households; namely, small 
private property and (outright) home ownership which, for historical reasons, has always 
been very high. It is fair to say that the austerity years have witnessed the most dramatic tax 
raid on personal income in recent memory in Southern European societies, hitting families in 
lower and middle incomes hard (on the effects of austerity on middle classes see also 
Petmesidou, 2011; Vaughan-Whitehead, 2016; Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 2017a).  
 
Below we review available data on poverty and the labour market to demonstrate how these 
measures brought about a crisis in the model of social reproduction of familistic welfare 
regimes in Southern Europe (see Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 2013). Historically, Southern 
European states and firms saw the minimisation of costs of labour and social reproduction as 
key drivers of economic competitiveness and capital accumulation (on social reproduction 
see Bakker and Gill, 2003). In Southern European welfare regimes family retained its 
traditional role as the primary agent of social protection when its members were out of the 
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labour market or lacked the necessary resources to maintain their living standard. Indicative 
strategies and practices included: securing social security rights via the primary earner’s 
formal employment (predominantly the father); providing substantial assets, or capital, to its 
members when they started their own family or business; and/or providing employment via 
the engagement of members in family businesses (see Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 2017b).  
 
This familistic mode of social reproduction was already in a crisis trajectory prior to the 
eruption of sovereign-debt crisis in 2008–09. Major challenges included the rise of private 
debt, fuelled by the cheap credit that became available in the Eurozone, and the increase in 
involuntary parttime employment due to labour market ‘flexibilisation’ (see Table 1; on 
neoliberalism and debtfare see Sodoerberg, 2014; on Southern Europe and debt see 
Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 2015). Key contributor to the increase of households’ 
indebtedness was the spectacular increase of housing loans and loans directed towards 
consumption and non-financial institutions like family businesses (see Papadopoulos and 
Roumpakis, 2013). Post-crisis, private indebtedness stabilised and began falling in all 
Southern European countries, apart from Greece where the gradual depletion of resources 
meant that many households had to resort to credit to meet even their basic needs. In 
addition, according to recent ECB data (Mesnard et al., 2016), non-performing loans (as 
percentage of all loans) reached 32% in Greece, 16% in Italy, 13% in Portugal and just below 
6% in Spain. A simple breakdown of debtors by category reveals that it is small and medium-
sized businesses (typically family owned) and households that represent the largest share of 
all non-performing debtors, indicating that households are unable to pay off their debts (see 
Annex 1 in Mesnard et al., 2016). The closure of hundreds of thousands of family-owned 
business, in combination to lower saving rates and the collapse of consumer confidence has 
led to a rapid decline in domestic demand and an explosion in unemployment, fuelling 
recession.  
 
The increase in households’ debt (as seen in Figure 1) was also accompanied by a significant 
fall in net savings as can be seen in Figure 2. The fall was more pronounced in Spain and 
Portugal in the years prior to the eruption of the crisis. The Italian households’ net savings 
were hit particularly hard in the aftermath of the crisis and have not recovered since. The 
volatility in Greek households’ savings rates prior to the crisis demonstrates that problems 
with [Figure 1 here] [Figure 2 here] saving were already pronounced during the pre-crisis 
years. The combined effects of increased taxation and income losses following wage cuts, 
pension cuts or unemployment (see Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 2013) led to the depletion 
of Greek households’ savings post-crisis. This negative trend can also be seen as a proxy for 
the extent of households’ reliance on using-up their cash reserves, private borrowing, or the 
selling of assets and property to make ends meet.  
 
Table 1 presents key indicators on Southern European labour markets. The levels of 
involuntary part-time employment increased rapidly since the eruption of the crisis with 
almost two-thirds of all part-time workers seeking full-time employment in Greece, Spain and 
Italy. In terms of job losses, the highest price was paid by women in Greece and Spain where, 
by 2015, female unemployment rates had skyrocketed to 28.9% and 23.6% respectively. 
Additionally, by 2015, almost 50% of all unemployed were looking for employment for more 
than 12 months in Spain, Italy and Portugal while in Greece this figure was 73.1%. 
Consequently, the share of children living in jobless  
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[Table 1 here]  
 
households also increased. By 2015 it had nearly doubled in Greece, Spain and Portugal and 
had increased by, at least, one third in Italy when compared to 2001. Overall, the highest 
unemployment rate was recorded in Greece and Spain where, in 2013, it reached 27.5% and 
26.1% respectively – truly unprecedented levels for developed countries during peace time. 
Data in Table 1 may give the impression that labour markets started to recover post-2013, 
especially in Portugal. However, to read these figures accurately we have to take into account 
the rise in emigration (usually by high-skilled youth), the rise in inactivity and the proliferation 
of involuntary part-time employment that accelerated post-crisis.  
 
The impact of the austerity measures and recession, combined with the downward pressures 
on wages and working conditions have caused living conditions to deteriorate and prolonged 
the ‘immiseration of Southern Europe’ (Petmesidou, 2013). In particular, as Figure 3 
demonstrates, the number of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion were at a downward 
trend in all Southern European societies until 2009. By 2013, all these gains were lost. And, 
although by 2015 poverty in Portugal and Spain began to decrease slightly, it persisted at very 
high levels in Greece and slightly increased in Italy. Greece is the country experiencing the 
highest levels, (close to 40% by 2015), the highest increase in people’s inability to make ends-
meet, with Portugal following at nearly 20% and Spain and Italy both closer to 14%. 
Understandably, the impact on social cohesion was severe: insecurity, homelessness, mental 
and physical health problems and suicides increased rapidly during  
 
[Figure 3 here]  
 
the austerity years, and continue to be high, especially in Greece and Spain (Govan, 2016; 
Karamessini and Giakoumatos, 2016; Lahad et al., 2016). Finally, the rather scarce data on 
Southern Europe’s housing sector reveal an accelerating problem with housing affordability 
and mortgage arrears which coincides with a dramatic rise in foreclosures and evictions 
(Arapoglou, 2016). Recent reforms allowed private landlords to liberalise rent agreements 
and gave them the opportunity to change terms and conditions (including rent) as well as 
evict tenants more quickly (Pittini et al., 2015). The rapid increase of non-performing loans 
after 2008 have led to numerous court cases for housing evictions, mostly in Greece and 
Spain. In Greece, the SYRIZAled government succumbed to the troika demands and 
introduced a law in 2015 that allows a shorter time-frame for both evictions and the purchase 
of non-performing loans by foreign funds for a fraction of their value. This gave the funds 
powers to collect and enforce claims at full value. In Spain a dramatic rise in foreclosures, 
exceeding 600,000 since 2008, resulted in more than 378,000 eviction orders being issued by 
2014 (CGPJ, 2015 cited in García-Lamarca, 2017). In Italy, a housing affordability crisis seems 
underway evidenced in the increased number of evictions (Pittini et al., 2015) and the 
proliferation of squatting, mainly in urban areas (Di Feliciantonio, 2016). Lastly, under 
pressure from the troika the Portuguese government re-regulated the rental market, making 
it easier for landlords to evict tenants.  
 
The combination of austerity measures and the ensuing recession, high levels of household 
debt, collapse of savings rates, cuts in wages and pensions, tax increases, unemployment, 
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under-employment and job precarity, and the deterioration of core services of the welfare 
state formed a ‘perfect storm’ that led to substantial income losses and accelerated insecurity 
in and out of the labour market (Wise, 2015; Gonzalez et al., 2016; Muñoz-De-Bustillo et al., 
2016; Simonazzi and Barbieri, 2016; Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 2017a). A political 
economy of generalised insecurity began to emerge in Southern Europe. It would be only a 
matter of time before the political fallout was felt.  
 
  
The popular revolt against austerity   
 
There was notable resistance to neoliberal reforms in Southern Europe for at least a decade 
prior to the sovereign debt crisis (Mattei, 2013; Spanou, 2008). However, pre-crisis, the 
legitimacy of national institutions of representative democracy or trust towards the EU and 
its institutions was never seriously questioned. It was the socioeconomic shock and severity 
of austerity measures and associated reforms that led to the fundamental breach of the 
political ‘contract’; not only between voters and traditional political parties but also between 
citizens and the politico-economic institutions at large. Post-crisis, the popularity of 
traditional electoral coalitions and party formations has either collapsed or has been seriously 
shaken, while the legitimacy of EU and national institutions has been severely challenged.  
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
One of the most profound manifestations of the political fallout is the collapse of trust 
towards the EU. Traditionally, Eurobarometer surveys recorded large majorities of South 
European citizens being trustful of the EU and its institutions. As Coakley (2016: 197) 
remarked ‘“Europe” represented hope and … a new age of prosperity and modernity’. By 2013 
the picture was totally reversed (see Mungiu- Pippidi, 2015: 20 and Table 9). South Europeans 
became deeply mistrustful of the EU, with trust levels shrinking by 40 percentage points in 
Greece, to only 18%, and by 37 percentage points in Spain, to only 17% (see Matthijs 2014: 
Figure 2). Trust levels in Italy and Portugal were relatively higher, 25% and 26% respectively, 
but substantially lower than the pre-2008 levels.  
The extent of mistrust and de-legitimation was even more pronounced towards domestic 
political institutions (Table 2). By 2013, only 7% of Spanish citizens trusted their national 
parliament, only 8% trusted their government and only 5% had any faith in their political 
parties. The respective figures for Greece were 10%, 10% and 4% respectively while in Italy 
they were 12%, 11% and 7% and in Portugal, 12%, 10% and 9% respectively. Compared to 
2008 the fall was truly spectacular: trust in national government in Spain, for example, had 
dropped by 37 percentage points while in Portugal by 24 percentage points.  
 
Set against this backdrop, the emergence of the indignados movement in Spain, the anti-
austerity movement of Aganaktismenoi (indignants) in Greece or the Movimento 5 Stelle in 
Italy are clear manifestations of the growing disillusionment with both domestic political 
regimes and the EU. Furthermore, as the impact of recession and austerity was worsening, 
the fragmentation and polarisation among the respective publics were deepening (Verney 
and Bosco, 2013). Eventually, the public sentiment was expressed electorally in all four 
countries, with new or previously marginal parties harnessing the energy and votes of these 
movements. The rise to power of the radical left coalition of SYRIZA in Greece (but also the 
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rise in popularity of the extreme right-wing party of ‘Golden Dawn’), the electoral successes 
of Podemos in Spain and the Five Star Movement-cum-party in Italy challenged the political 
status quo, both domestically and in the EU. Even in Portugal, where politics are still 
dominated by mainstream parties, there was a surge of support for the anti-austerity radical 
Left Bloc and the Communist Party in the 2015 general elections. Eventually they were invited 
(and accepted) to support a minority government led by the social democratic Socialist Party.  
 
It was in Greece where the political challenge to austerity went beyond domestic politics. The 
election of SYRIZA in January 2015 sent political shockwaves to the rest of the EU political 
elites and appeared as the first credible threat to the hegemony of ordoliberalism in the EU. 
SYRIZA’s coalition of social movements actively campaigned not merely against austerity at 
home but against what they perceived as the EU’s neoliberal order. However, after nearly six 
months of negotiations, the message from the lenders was clear: the precondition for any 
new agreement was further austerity measures under the troika’s surveillance. With its back 
to the wall, the Greek government announced a referendum (held on 5th July 2015) on an EU 
proposal that represented the continuation of austerity measures unabated. The ECB 
retaliated by blocking the Greek banks’ access to liquidity, forcing the Greek government to 
order their closure and to impose capital controls during the week before the referendum. 
Defying all opinion polls, the closed banks and the negative propaganda from inside and 
outside the country, 61% of the Greek electorate voted ‘No’ and rejected the deal. Still, it was 
not meant to be democracy’s turn. A week later, facing the threat of an imposed Grexit from 
the Eurozone, the Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras accepted a new (worse) deal. Amidst 
an avalanche of resignations of many prominent SYRIZA members new elections were 
declared for September 2015 which SYRIZA won. However, with absenteeism reaching 43% – 
a record in a country where voting is compulsory – the Greek electorate appeared tired and 
disillusioned. A new SYRIZA government of ‘pragmatists’ began implementing neoliberal 
policies similar to those that they were originally elected to oppose.  
 
In Spain, PODEMOS also shook the political establishment and managed to pose a serious 
challenge to the two major parties that ruled Spain during the post-dictatorship era. A radical-
left party rooted in political activism, PODEMOS gained significant popularity and in the 2015 
national elections came third, attracting 20.65% of the vote, very close behind PSOE (Spain’s 
social democratic party). Elections took place again in 2016 following the failure of any of the 
parties to form a government. PODEMOS contested as a coalition with other minor parties 
but suffered (limited) electoral losses, seemingly caught between its radical-left anti-austerity 
campaign and a postelection strategy that would necessitate a coalition with other 
moderate/centrist political parties. PODEMOS electoral tactics aside, it is no secret that the 
‘SYRIZA experiment’ had cast a heavy shadow over the possibility of a radical anti-austerity 
party participating in government in Spain.  
 
So far, reversing austerity policies by electoral means, has failed. The new mode of 
(ordoliberal) economic governance in the EU has effectively precluded democratically elected 
governments in Southern Europe from changing their economic policies, thus putting the very 
purpose of having national democratic elections in doubt (Guardian, 2016). Still, although the 
prospects of challenging austerity through formal politics appears hapless and hopeless, 
grassroots action may offer a glimpse of hope.  
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For example, action groups in Greece were successful at interrupting the judicial process of 
home evictions, at least until the end of 2017, using both legal means and direct action like 
disrupting court hearings. In Spain, the Platforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca (PAH; Platform 
for People Affected by Mortgage) organised solidarity actions and engaged in legal activism 
that led to important judicial rulings against evictions. For example, following the PAH’s 
referral of an eviction case to the European Court of Human Rights the Court ruled that the 
Spanish government should safeguard its citizens’ human right to housing (see Arapoglou, 
2016; Bakero, 2015). Other forms of grassroots’ action include workers’ occupations of 
factories abandoned by their owners – like the VIOME factory in Greece, currently a self-
managed cooperative (Karyotis, 2016) – or the mobilisation to stop water privatisation in the 
Greek city of Thessaloniki by a coalition of trade unions, civil society organisations and local 
citizens. Rumours about water privatisation plans led to fierce protests that culminated into 
organising in 2013 the first successful ‘European Citizens’ Initiative’: more than 1.6 million EU 
citizens signed a call to the EC to make a legislative proposal that formally recognised UN’s 
human right to water. Further, a referendum organised on 18 May 2014 in Thessaloniki 
returned 98% disapproval for water privatisation. This form of collective mobilisation that 
combined both local and transnational forms of action managed to stop the plans for water 
privatisation in Greece (Kanellopoulou, 2013). Together with the PAH case in Spain they 
provide important lessons regarding the effectiveness of social mobilisation when action at 
local, national and transnational levels is coordinated.  
 
  
Concluding Reflections  
 
In our article we explored how the popular revolt against austerity in Southern Europe was 
the outcome of profound politico-economic changes related to the emergence of a 
transnational ordoliberal regime of macro-economic surveillance in the EU. We demonstrated 
that, apart from contributing to the ongoing recession, the ‘shock therapy’ of austerity 
measures hit hard the pillars of the Southern European welfare model (i.e. employment 
security, home ownership, pension adequacy). The traditional familistic mode of social 
reproduction has been destabilised by the emergence of a new political economy of 
generalised insecurity. In this political economy, the familial household faces high levels of 
indebtedness, substantial income reductions and continuous assaults on its socioeconomic 
security.  
 
The popular revolt against austerity challenged traditional parliamentary politics and parties 
and questioned the legitimacy of EU’s ordoliberal economic governance, if not the integrity 
of the EU itself. At the same time numerous citizens experimented with new forms of 
democratic practices and mobilised at local, national and transnational levels of action. Yet, 
so far, national democratic politics (electoral or grassroots) have been unable to influence the 
direction of economic policy. The domestic austerity-driven policy agenda remained 
unchanged while ‘Europe’s ordoliberal iron cage’ remained intact. In this new era, where 
political accountability lies in the transnational ‘twilight zone between the member states and 
the EU’ (Bonefeld (2015: 879) member states’ governments are conditioned, under the threat 
of penalties, to pursue budget surpluses in perpetuity, to institutionalize austerity and to 
thwart any wage demands that outstrip productivity.  
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The capitulation of the anti-austerity but, otherwise, pro-European, SYRIZA government in 
2015 was followed by a large number of electoral near-misses of a resurgent far right in 
Europe (Austria, the Netherlands, France) and the Brexit outcome of the UK referendum in 
2016. Against this background, the only other serious political challenge to the hegemony of 
ordoliberalism in the EU seems to come from what Worth (2016: 17) characterised as 
nationalist ‘market Eurosceptics’ who ‘have managed to co-opt some of the extremes of the 
far right … to fit within a wider neoliberal discourse’. It remains an open question how an 
ordoliberal EU will accommodate the rising tide of market Eurosceptics when pro-European, 
critical of austerity but socially progressive voices were so brutally neutralised, as in Greece. 
The unity of the EU and the governance of its integration were never more fragile.  
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Figure 1: Household debt (%) in Southern Europe and Germany, 1999 – 2015 
   
 
Note: Total household debt as a percentage of net disposable income 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Figure 2: Saving rates (%) in Southern Europe and Germany, 1995-2015 
 
Note: Net savings as percentage of net disposable income 
Source: OECD 
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Table 1: Employment and unemployment indicators and children living in jobless households in 
Southern Europe, 2001-2015 
YEAR 2001 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 
Involuntary part-time employment as % of part-time unemployment 
Greece 51.9 44.1 49.8 54.7 60.3 64.9 68.2 71.2 72.6 
63.2 
65.6 
50.1 
Spain 22.4 36.0 44.2 50.1 56.0 61.3 63.3 64.0 
Italy 37.7 41.3 46.4 50.2 54.2 58.5 62.8 65.4 
Portugal 21.9 40.3 37.7 42.1 45.1 47.4 48.8 49.3 
 
Total Unemployment 
Greece 10.7 7.8 9.6 12.7 17.9 24.5 27.5 26.5 24.9 
22.1 
11.9 
12.6 
Spain 10.6 11.3 17.9 19.9 21.4 24.8 26.1 24.5 
Italy 9.0 6.7 7.7 8.4 8.4 10.7 12.1 12.7 
Portugal 5.1 8.8 10.7 12.0 12.9 15.8 16.4 14.1 
 
Female unemployment 
Greece 16.1 11.5 13.3 16.4 21.5 28.2 31.4 30.2 28.9 
23.6 
12.7 
12.9 
Spain 15.2 12.8 18.1 20.2 21.8 25.1 26.7 25.4 
Italy 12.1 8.5 9.2 9.6 9.5 11.8 13.1 13.8 
Portugal 5.1 9.0 10.3 12.2 13.2 15.6 16.6 14.5 
 
Long-term unemployment (as part of total unemployed) 
Greece 52.0 47.1 40.4 44.6 49.3 59.1 67.1 73.5 73.1 
51.6 
58.1 
57.4 
Spain 36.1 18.0 23.8 36.6 41.6 44.4 49.7 52.8 
Italy 64.5 45.2 44.3 48.0 51.4 52.6 56.4 60.8 
Portugal 33.5 43.0 40.0 47.6 48.4 48.8 56.4 59.6 
 
Children aged 0-17 living in jobless households* 
Greece 5.5 3.6 4.9 6.3 9.2 13.0 13.3 11.3 11.5 
11.8 
10.6 
6.7 
Spain 6.6 6.5 9.9 10.7 11.9 13.8 14.1 13.0 
Italy 6.9 6.8 7.6 8.2 8.4 9.2 10.3 10.8 
Portugal 3.8 4.8 6.2 7.1 7.9 9.4 10.1 7.7 
 
 
Source: Eurostat 
Note: *: share of persons aged 0-17 who are living in households where no-one is working 
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Figure 3: At risk of poverty or social exclusion (left) and Inability to make ends-meet (right), 2004-
2015 
 
  
  Source: Eurostat 
 
 
Table 2. 
Trust in national institutions in south EU member states (2008 and 2013) 
 
 Trust in 
national 
Parliament 
2013 
(%) 
Change in 
trust in 
national 
Parliament 
since 2008 
(%) 
Trust in 
national 
government 
2013 
(%) 
Change in 
trust in 
national 
government 
since 2008 
(%) 
Trust in 
political 
parties 
2013 
(%) 
Change in 
trust in 
political 
parties 
since 2008 
(%) 
Greece 10 -22 10 -14 4 -10 
Italy 12 -15 11 -14 7 -9 
Portugal 12 -26 10 -21 9 -8 
Spain 7 -32 8 -37 5 -25 
EU (average) 29 -7 29 -8 19 -3 
 
Source: Mungiu-Pippidi (2015:10, Table 2), based on Eurobarometer data 
 
 
 
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
Germany
Greece
Spain
Italy
Portugal
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
45.0
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
Germany
Greece
Spain
Italy
Portugal
16 
 
 References  
 
Afouxenidis A (2015) Neoliberalism and democracy. In: Dubrow J (ed.) Age of Democracy, Age 
of Inequality: Global Perspectives on Political Inequality. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 40–48.  
 
Arapoglou V (2016) Researching housing exclusion and homelessness in Southern Europe: 
Learning through comparing cities and tracking policies. European Journal of Homelessness 
10: 87–108.  
 
Bakero I (2015) When rights need to be (re) claimed: Austerity measures, neoliberal housing 
policies and anti-eviction activism in Spain. Critical Social Policy 35: 270–280.  
 
Bakker I and Gill S (eds) (2003) Power, Production and Social Reproduction: Human In/ security 
in the Global Political Economy. London: Palgrave Macmillan  
 
Barbier J-C. (2012) Tracing the fate of EU ‘social policy’: Changes in political discourse from 
the ‘Lisbon Strategy’ to ‘Europe 2020’. International Labour Review 151: 377–399.  
 
Bernaciak M and Muller T (2013) Austerity Policies and the Changing Context of Collective 
Bargaining in Europe. Benchmarking Working Europe 2013. Brussels: ETUI.  
 
Bonefeld W (2013) Human economy and social policy: On ordo-liberalism and political 
authority. History of the Human Sciences, 26: 106–125.  
 
Bonefeld W (2015) European economic constitution and the transformation of democracy: 
On class and the state of law. European Journal of International Relations, 21: 867–886.  
 
Busch K, Hermann C, Hinrichs K and Shulten T (2013) Euro crisis, austerity policy and the 
European social model: How crisis policies in Southern Europe threaten the EU’s social 
dimension. Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.  
 
Cahill D (2014) The End of Laissez-Faire? On the Durability of Embedded Neoliberalism. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.  
 
Coakley M (2016) Ireland, Europe and the Global Crisis. Journal of World-Systems Research 
22: 177–201.  
 
Copeland P and Daly M (2015) Social Europe: From ‘add-on’ to ‘dependence-upon’ economic 
integration. In: Crespy A and Menz G (eds) Social Policy and the Euro Crisis. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, pp. 140–160.  
 
de la Porte C and Heins E (2015) A new era of European Integration? Governance of labour 
market and social policy since the sovereign debt crisis, Contemporary European Politics 13: 
8–28.  
 
Degryse C, Jepsen M and Pochet P (2013) The Euro Crisis and Its Impact on National and 
European Social Policies. Brussels: European Trade Union Institution.  
17 
 
 
Dehousse R (2012) The ‘Fiscal Compact’: Legal uncertainty and political ambiguity. Policy Brief 
33: 1–4.  
 
Di Feliciantonio C (2016) Subjectification in times of indebtedness and neoliberal/ austerity 
urbanism. Antipode 48: 1206–1227.  
 
Dullien S and Guérot U (2012) The Long Shadow of Ordoliberalism. Commentary, European 
Council on Foreign Relations, 27 July. Available at: http://www. 
ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_long_shadow_of_ordoliberal (accessed 8 June 2015).  
 
European Council (2012) Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance – Eurozone. 
Brussels: European Council.  
 
Farnsworth K and Irving Z (2015), Social Policy in Times of Austerity: Global Economic Crisis 
and the New Politics of Welfare. Bristol: Policy Press.  
 
García-Lamarca M (2017) From occupying plazas to recuperating housing: Insurgent practices 
in Spain. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research. DOI: 10.1111/1468-
2427.12386.  
 
Giannone D (2015) Suspending democracy? The governance of the EU’s political and 
economic crisis as a process of neoliberal restructuring. In: Demetriou K (ed.) The European 
Union in Crisis. Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, pp. 101–119.  
 
Gill S (2017) Transnational class formations, European crisis and the silent revolution. Critical 
Sociology 43: 635–651.  
 
Gonzalez P, Figueiredo A, Figueiredo H and Santos LD (2016) Still holding on? Inequality, 
labour market and middle income groups in Portugal. In: Vaughan- Whitehead D (ed.) 
Europe’s Disappearing Middle Class? Evidence from the World of Work. Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, pp. 441–494.  
 
Govan F (2016) Spain’s suicide rate jumps to record high in economic crisis. The Local, 31 
March. Available at: https://www.thelocal.es/20160331/suicide-ratein- spain-reaches-new-
record (accessed 14 July 2017).  
 
Gropas R (2016) Creative resistance in times of economic crises. In: Iglesias-Rodriguez P, 
Triandafyllidou A and Gropas R (eds) After the Financial Crisis: Shifting Legal, Economic and 
Political Paradigms. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 215–240.  
 
Guardian (2012) Robert Mundell, evil genius of the euro. 26 June. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jun/26/robert-mundellevil- genius-
euro (accessed 11 March 2015).  
 
18 
 
Guardian (2016) Yanis Varoufakis: Why we must save the EU. The Guardian, 5 April. Available 
at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/05/yanisvaroufakis- why-we-must-save-
the-eu (accessed 11 March 2015).  
 
Hermann C (2014) Structural adjustment and neoliberal convergence in labour markets and 
welfare: The impact of the crisis and austerity measures on European economic and social 
models. Competition & Change 18: 111–130.  
 
Holden C (2014) Global poverty and inequality. In: Yeates N (ed.) Understanding Global Social 
Policy. Bristol: The Policy Press, pp. 21–52.  
 
Kanellopoulou M (2013) Thoughts on ‘how to win’: the water struggle in Greece. ROAR 
Magazine. Available at: https://roarmag.org/essays/save-greek-water-privatization/ 
(accessed 31 January 2015).  
 
Karamessini M (2008) Still a distinctive Southern European employment model? Industrial 
Relations Journal 39: 510–531.  
 
Karamessini M and Giakoumatos S (2016) The Greek middle classes facing an uncertain 
future. In: Vaughan-Whitehead D (ed.) Europe’s Disappearing Middle Class? Evidence from 
the World of Work. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 233–278.  
 
Karyotis T (2016) Chronicles of a defeat foretold. ROAR Magazine. Available at: 
https://roarmag.org/magazine/syriza-movements-power-commons/ (accessed 31 January 
2015).  
 
Kennett P (2017) (Dis)integration, disjuncture and the multidimensional crisis of the European 
social project. In: Kennett P and Lendvai-Bainton N (eds.) Handbook of European Social Policy. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 416–432.  
 
Lahad M, Cohen R, Fanaras S, Leykin D and Apostolopoulou P (2016) Resiliency and 
adjustment in times of crisis: The case of the Greek economic crisis from a psycho- social and 
community perspective. Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary 
Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement 135(1): 333–356.  
 
Marginson P (2015) Coordinated bargaining in Europe: From incremental corrosion to frontal 
assault? European Journal of Industrial Relations 21: 97–114.  
 
Mattei U (2013) Protecting the commons: Water, culture, and nature: The commons 
movement in the Italian struggle against neoliberal governance, South Atlantic Quarterly 112: 
366–376.  
 
Matthijs M (2014) Mediterranean blues: the crisis in Southern Europe. Journal of Democracy 
25: 101–115.  
 
Menz G and Crespy A (2015) Social Policy and the Eurocrisis: Quo Vadis Social Europe. London: 
Palgrave Macmillan.  
19 
 
 
Mesnard B, Margerit A, Powe C and Magnus M (2016) Non-performing Loans in the Banking 
Union: Stocktaking and Challenges. Brussels: European Parliament.  
 
Milanovic B (2016) Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalisation. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
 
Moreira A, Alonso Dominguez Á, Antune C, Karamessini M, Raitano M and Glatzer M (2015) 
Austerity-driven labour market reforms in Southern Europe: Eroding the security of labour 
market insiders. European Journal of Social Security 17: 202–225.  
 
Mungiu-Pippidi A (2015) Public Integrity and Trust in Europe, Berlin: European Research 
Centre for Anti-Corruption and State-Building (ERCAS). Berlin: Hertie School of Governance.  
 
Muñoz-De-Bustillo R and Antón JI (2016) Knocking on heaven’s door: Changes in the world of 
work and the middle class in Spain. In: Vaughan-Whitehead D (ed.) Europe’s Disappearing 
Middle Class? Evidence from the World of Work. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 495–542.  
 
Natali D and Stamati F (2014) Reassessing Southern European pensions after the crisis: 
Evidence from two decades of reforms, Southern European Society and Politics 19: 309–330.  
 
Ojala M and Harjuniemi T (2016) Mediating the German Ideology: Ordoliberal Framing in 
European Press Coverage of the Eurozone Crisis, Journal of Contemporary European Studies 
24: 414–430.  
 
Papadopoulos T and Roumpakis A (2012) The Greek welfare state in the age of austerity: Anti-
social policy and the politico-economic crisis. In: Kilkey M, Ramia G and Farnsworth K (eds) 
Social Policy Review 24: Analysis and Debate in Social Policy. Bristol: Policy Press, pp. 205–
230.  
 
Papadopoulos T and Roumpakis A (2013) Familistic welfare capitalism in crisis: Social 
reproduction and anti-social policy in Greece. Journal of International and Comparative Social 
Policy 29: 204–224.  
 
Papadopoulos T and Roumpakis A (2015) Democracy, austerity and crisis: Southern Europe 
and the decline of the European Social Model. In: Romano S and Punziano G (eds) The 
European Social Model Adrift. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp.189–211.  
 
Papadopoulos T and Roumpakis A (2017a) The erosion of Southern Europe’s middle classes: 
Debt, insecurity and the political economy of austerity Sociologia e politiche sociali 20: 67–
89.  
 
Papadopoulos T and Roumpakis A (2017b) Family as a socio-economic actor in the political 
economies of East and South-East Asian welfare capitalisms. Social Policy & Administration 
51: 857–875.  
 
20 
 
Petmesidou M (2011) What future for the middle classes and ‘inclusive solidarity’ in Southern 
Europe?, Global Social Policy 11: 225–227.  
 
Petmesidou M (2013) Austerity and the Spectre of ‘Immiseration’ on the Periphery of Europe. 
Bergen: University of Bergen, CROP, Poverty Brief.  
 
Petmesidou M and Glatzer M (2015) The crisis imperative, reform dynamics and rescaling in 
Greece and Portugal. European Journal of Social Security 17: 157–180.  
 
Pittini A, Ghekière L, Dijol J and Kiss I (2015) The State of Housing in the EU. Brussels: Housing 
Europe Observatory.  
 
Roumpakis A and Papadopoulos T (2017) From social regulation of competition to 
competition as social regulation: Transformations in the socio-economic governance of the 
European Union. in Horsfall D and Hudson J (eds) Social Policy in an Era of Global Competition: 
Comparative, International and Local Perspectives. Bristol: The Policy Press, pp. 53–69.  
 
Ryner M (2015) Europe’s ordoliberal iron cage: Critical political economy, the Euro Area Crisis 
and its management. Journal of European Public Policy 22: 275–294.  
 
Sacchi S (2015) Conditionality by other means: EU involvement in Italy’s structural reforms in 
the sovereign debt crisis. Contemporary European Politics 13: 77-92.  
 
Schäfer A and Streeck W (2013) Introduction: Politics in the age of austerity. In: Schäfer A and 
Streeck W (eds) Politics in the Age of Austerity. Cambridge: Polity, pp. 1–25.  
 
Schäuble W (2011) Speech by the German Federal Minister of Finance Dr Wolf-gang Schäuble 
4th Lindau Meeting in Economics. Available at: 
http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/EN/Reden/2011/2011-08-27-nobelpreis-
lindau.html (accessed 12 September 2017).  
 
Simonazzi A and Barbieri T (2016) The middle class in Italy: Reshuffling, erosion, polarisation. 
In: Vaughan-Whitehead D (ed.) Europe’s Disappearing Middle Class? Evidence from the World 
of Work. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 360–389.  
 
Soederberg S (2014) Debtfare States and the Poverty Industry: Money, Discipline and the 
Surplus Population. London: Routledge.  
 
Storey A (2017) The Myths of Ordoliberalism. Working Paper 17-02, ERC Project ‘European 
Unions’. Dublin: University College Dublin. Available at: https:// www.erc-
europeanunions.eu/working-papers/ (accessed 27 November 2017).  
 
Streeck W (2012) Markets and peoples. New Left Review 73: 63–71.  
 
Streeck W (2013) Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism. London and New 
York: Verso.  
 
21 
 
Streeck W (2014) The politics of public debt: Neoliberalism, capitalist development and the 
restructuring of the state, German Economic Review 15:143–165  
 
Spanou C (2008) State reform in Greece: Responding to old and new challenges. International 
Journal of Public Sector Management 21: 150–173.  
 
Suiter J (2001) Economist ‘spiritual father’ of the euro. The Irish Times, 27 January. Available 
at: https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economist-spiritual-fatherof- the-euro-1.274443 
(accessed 11 September 2017).  
 
Supiot A (2013) The public–private relation in the context of today’s refeudalisation. 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 11: 129–145  
 
Verney S and Bosco A (2013) Living parallel lives: Italy and Greece in an age of austerity. 
Southern European Society and Politics 18: 397–426.  
 
Vaughan-Whitehead D (2014) The European Social Model in Times of Crisis. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar and Geneva: International Labour Organisation.  
 
Vaughan-Whitehead D (ed.) (2016) Europe’s Disappearing Middle Class? Evidence from the 
World of Work. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.  
 
Wise P (2015) Portugal divided by austerity. Financial Times, 1 December. Available at: 
https://www.ft.com/content/4a0a2c44-8489-11e5-8095-ed1a37d1e096 (accessed 27 July 
2016).  
 
Woodruff DM (2016) Governing by panic: The politics of the Eurozone Crisis. Politics & Society 
44: 81–116.  
 
Worth O (2016) The battle for hegemony: Resistance and neoliberal restructuring in post-
crisis Europe Comparative European Politics 15(1): 1–17.  
 
Zacune J, with Buxton N, Brennan B, Kishimoto S, Tricarico A and Fattori T (2013) Privatising 
Europe: Using the crisis to entrench Neoliberalism. Amsterdam: Transnational Institute.  
 
  
  
22 
 
Author biographies  
 
Theodoros Papadopoulos is a Lecturer in Social Policy in the Department of Social and Policy Sciences, 
University of Bath. His research interests include the transformation of EU socioeconomic governance; 
the political economy of familistic welfare regimes; and social policy in Latin America. Recent 
publications: with A. Roumpakis, ‘The erosion of Southern Europe’s middle classes: Debt, insecurity 
and the political economy of austerity’, Sociologie e Politiche Sociali 20(2) (2017); with A. Roumpakis, 
‘From social regulation of competition to competition as social regulation: Transformations in the 
socio-economic governance of the European Union’, in D. Horsfall and J. Hudson (eds) Social Policy in 
an Era of Competition (Policy Press, 2017).  
 
 Antonios Roumpakis is a Lecturer in Comparative Social Policy in the Department of Social Policy & 
Social Work, University of York. His research interests include the political economy of familistic 
welfare capitalism; the transformation of EU socioeconomic governance; and social policy in East Asia. 
Recent publications: with T. Papadopoulos, ‘The erosion of Southern Europe’s middle classes: Debt, 
insecurity and the political economy of austerity’, Sociologie e Politiche Sociali 20(2) (2017); with T. 
Papadopoulos , ‘Family as a socio-economic actor in the political economies of East and South-East 
Asian welfare capitalisms’, Social Policy & Administration, 51(6) (2017).   
i Corresponding author: Theodoros Papadopoulos, Department of Social and Policy Sciences, University of 
Bath, Bath, BA2 7AY, UK. Email: t.papadopoulos@bath.ac.uk 
                                                          
